as far as possible into the productive years of adolescence and adulthood. T hus in proto-industrial areas rates of population growth are presumed to have been faster than in strictly agricultural regions, populatiorn density greater and household size larger.', Proto-industry broke a previous demographic homeostasis: 'population and domestic industry grew jointly, reinforcing each other's extension'.Y7 These demographic changes were accelerated as 'merchant capital, by drawiilg an essentially pre-capitalist social formation --namely peasant society --into its sphere, promoted the process of accumulation and became the pacemaker of the general acceptance of the market principle '.18 The social consequences of this were considerable, and apparently included far-reaching changes in familial relations and the disappearance of 'traditional' sexual divisions of labour.'9
While unable fully to discuss all the features of proto-industrial theory, we shall consider some of the problems in this explanation of social and economic change in the early modern world. Kriedte has written that:
The introduction of a new terin to characterize a specific stage in socio-economic (developmenelt is justified only if it can be operationalized. It must be possible to assign to it empirically verifiable indicators.20
His own criterion of proto-industry stressed that the level of industrial income should exceed that from agricuilture, and that production must be mainly for non-local markets.2' Both Mendels aild Kriedte have stressed that the existenec of (often substantial) proportions of non-agricultural workers involved in rural domestic industry (found in parts of Europe from the twelfth century if not earlier) is not by itself a sufficient indicator.22 And the latest of a range of definlitions from Mendels has emphasized that the market should be located outside the region of production; that production should bc by precariously self-subsistent peasan-ts, although the process was organized from, and the product sometimes finished in, towns; and that there should be a 'symbiosis of rural industry with the regional development of commercial agricuilture'.23 These definitions provide a reasonably concrete starting point. However, it must be said straight away that it is difficult to estimate either earnings or production, as criticisms of J. U. iNef's theory of an 'industrial revolution' in the sixteenth century have shown.24 It is harder still to determine the prop)ortion of' Iproduction for supra-regional and international markets '.25 At what stage for examp)le did the market transcend purely local horizons and thus promote 476 HISTORICAL JOURNAL
We must recognize initially that the heuristic value of the theory seems to be limited to northlwesterrn Europe in so far as it stresses economic, demograp)hic alid social structural changes consequent on inclustrial comnmodity productionI for wider markets. According to Medick et al. ' protoindustrialization could establish itself only where the ties of the feudal systemn hadl either loosened or were in the process of full disintegration'.27 In parts of central Russia the shift after about I76o from labour services to payment iri caslh or kind was associated with a sharp rise in particip)ationl in cottage industry.28 However, this was not always the case, arid Kriedte points to the example of the feudal lords (Gutssherren) oIn the Silesian border, where linen production was drawn into the system of feudal obligations.29 Bohemian industrial commodity production was fitted into the structure of feudal exp)loitation and was used to preserve feudal relations.3z) Side by side with feudal landlords we can nevertheless detect successful serf-capitalists or kulak-type peasant middlemen.3' Further, the serf system favoured cottage industry over concentrated manufactures, with the result that factories did not rep)lace domestic labour until the twentieth century.32 In -arts of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Russia rural domestic production c.ompeted successfully with large, concentrated manufactories.3 Finally there was little regional specialization of agriculture anid inidustry since industrial commodity production was located in the same household as agriculture.34
Nor do the cdemographic predictiolns of proto-industrial theory work outside northwestern Europe, since before the nineteenlth cerntury in eastern and southern Europe age at first marriage for women was usually already low ---typ)ically I 7---2 comp)ared to 23---27 in northwestern Europe ---proportions never married were low, migration by inidividuals was restricted and households were large.35 Intensification of industrial commodity production in eighteenth-aiid nineteenth-century Japan and Russia was not associated with a fall in the age of marriage or greater population density.36 Mean household size was actually smaller in industrial regiorns of Russia compared to agricultural ones.37 Land was made available by the commnunity in Russia, so that there was no constraint creatcd by the need to wait for inheritance, from whichi young couples could be freed by industrial employmnent opportunities.38 In Russia as in Japan family and community control over individuals remained strong, and the division of labour betweerl (predominantly female) industrial production and (largely male) agricultural proCductiorl remained a prominent 27 KMS, I. 6. 28 R. L. Rudolph, 'Family structure and proto-industrialization in Russia', Jnl Leon. HIst. Anglian woollen industry, thc pillow-lace and straw plait industries of Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire and Huntingdonshire, thc linen industry on the Norfolk-Suffolk border, calico-printing in parts of Surrey, thc Essex silk industry, or hand and framework knitting in many still unenclosed arable-based Leicestershire villages. Even the Suffolk woollen industry was not located in wood-pasture areas, and only half of thc Suffolk villages active in thc industry lay in a pastoral region. Thc rest were in a sheep--corn district. All such industries were proto-industrial in that they produced for non-local markets. In Scotland thc pressure of population on scarce economic resources produced a greater involvement in linen-yarr production in the Highlands during thc eighteenth century, but therce was also a substantial amount of spinning and manufacture in rural areas and small towns such as Kilmarnock, set in thc rich arable land of thc Western Lowlands.46 SuCh contrary examples are common too on thc continent, and raise obvious doubts about thc exact agrarian preconditions of proto-industrialization. Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohmn seem to recognize thc many exceptions, but these do much to vitiate thc thcory at an early stage.
II
Their discussion of this (as of many other) issues is indeed replete withl qualificatory phrases,47 and there are frequently more exceptions than they admit. At thc same time, many of thc different agrarian preconditions and contexts they list arc thcoretically quite incompatible. They include conditions of seasonal (winter) unemployment associated with arable and commercial farming; generalized structural unemployment; the predominance of subsistence and strictly peasant farms; 'barren mountain regions'; commercial stock-raising districts; situations where there had been a subdivision of holdings; places where money rents were rising; poor-soiled and less productive pastoral districts; population growth; areas near towns with labour shortages, sometimes with guild and company controls to be escaped; areas with chcap raw materials, or with low taxes and/or prices; districts faced with different forms of agricultural depression; rising rural real wages or wages above subsistence requirements; 'a labour system that was still essentially feudal... in which "property rights" were not fully assured' ;48 rural areas proximate to ports; districts with marketing and transport facilities; a 'more open and flexible social order' than obtained where 'tthe collective controls of thc village were still unbroken', and so on.49 The thcory aims to delineate and typify in a certain form the nature of expanding rural industry, but in this regard almost every conceivable European agrarian context is encompassed. As Kriedte eventually admits: 'Despite what was said earlier, those forms [agrarian preconditions] could vary greatly'.50 Thc authors acknowledge regional diversity, but from thc start force it into a very limiting thcoretical framework.
Nevertheless, thc consistent emphasis in proto-industrial thcory is thc need for industrial commodity production among peasant smallholders whose relatively unproductive upland holdings have become fragmented, and where demographic pressure on limited resources was acute. Proto-industry is said to be thc 'child of poverty'; and because of their foothold on thc land and non-capitalist mentality 46 these now semi-proletarian 'peasants' tended to remain poor wlhile surplus wealth was extracted by urban-based entrepreneurs. Despite demand for their products, earnings apparently remained desparately low, especially in thc final stages when proto-industry was glutted by its own demographic repercussions, and threatened by thc factory system to which its course of development apparently led it. However, we should strcss that proto-industry often emerged during periods of rising real wages, and indeed frequeritly enhanced thc wages of industrial commodity producers particularly before thc late eighteenth century. For example, it allowed a higher standard of living in parts of Belgium,5" or among thc hand and framework knitters in Leicestershire;52 or in the metal and weapons trade around Li~ge;53 or for thc English handloom weavers until late in thc eighteenth century.54 In pillow lace and straw plait too, earnings (especially for women) could be considerably enhanced,55 and this was also true for some glove-making areas. Thc presenice of rural domestic industry could also maintain familial income during periods wlhen agricultural real wages were commonly falling, as for example in thc hosiery districts of thc southern Midlands of England after about I 770.56 Real wages in cerealproducing areas of southern England often fell sharply in areas lacking cottage industry.57 All this suggests that proto-industrial areas were not necessarily fearful poverty traps; and that thc emphasis given to proto-industry as a major explanation of continued pauperism is overdrawn and simplistic in ignoring many other factors.58 Thc arguments of Medick et al. that proto-industry developed from and perpetuated a specific context of agrarian poverty through the relationship of population to the needs of capitalist production singularly fail to take cognizance of the actual experience of proto-industrial regions. was dependent on thc inheritance of land; and that industrial employmcilt destroyed the connexion between inheritance ofland and marriage, and so removed disincentives to early marriage. Proto-industrial workers therefore married earlier than their agricultural counterparts, and since more of the vwoman's childbearing years were utilized population would rise.7' Significant differences can certainly be detected in thc demographically crucial age at first marriage for women between some cottage industrial and agricultural populations. At Comines in north-east France for thc years I 739-89 thc mean age at first marriage for brides involved in textile production was 25-3 years, wihile for peasant brides it was 28.72 Four agricultural villages in French Flanders during thc period I690--I799 had female marriage ages ranging from 27 6 to fully 30, but in two proto-industrial villages in this region ages were 22-4 and 23 7.73 However, thc picture is not as simple as it may appear. In a group of villages in thc Thimerais, situated between Chartres and Dreux, the rate of increase in age at first marriage for women marrying laboureurs (big farmers) over thc eighteenth century was much less than forjournaliers -mainly weavers and labourers.74 During thc I 720s laboureur women were marrying on average at 23-I years, but by I 760--89 this had risen to 25-2. For journaliers thc comparable increase was 2I-9 to 26 3. At thc same time, though not dealing with specifically proto-industrial communities, thc work of John Knodel on eighteenth-and nincteenth-century German villages casts serious doubt on thc connexion between proletarianization and population increase through thc mechanisms of nuptiality and fertility. He finds that farmers' wives were almost invariably younger wihen they first married than were thc wives cither of artisans or of cottagers and unskilled labourers.75 These differences in thc demographically crucial female age at marriage are consistent over time and across all villages studied. Lastly, by comparing two villages in the Basse Meuse region of Belgium wihich mixed agriculture with mining and metal working, with one in thc Pays de Herve wsherc agricultural changes during thc eighteenth century increased involvement in spinning and weaving woollen cloth, G(uttman and Leboutte found that thc predictions were cither seriously attenuated or not fulfilled.76 There was no significant fall in thc female age at first marriage in thc proto-industrializing village of Thimister until thc fertility transition in thc late nincteenth century. Age at marriage in thc coalmining community of Vottem was 71 KMS, pp. 82 9. Medick ainld others aire perhatps too reatdy to rcjcct thc ideat that ini-migrattioni of people in thc nubile atge groups produced gross increases in vitatl rattes, of thc kinid idenitified by Bratuni ainld Levinic in inidustriatl communities with weatk controls on imnmigrattioti. Bratuni, 'Eatrly inidustriatlizattioni ainld demographic change', p. only marginally below that of more traditional artisans. The demographic c hanges discussed by Mendels, Levine and others are not exclusively, nor perhaps generally, associated with proto-industrialization. Thc need for a wider comparative context is illustrated in thc demiographic work of Levine.77 Mendels rather boldly asscrts that 'thc demographic aspects of the hypotheses were fully tested out by David Levine on some English parishes'.78 Yet Levine's work is marred by thc narrowness of his key comparison of demographic patterns in thc proto-industrial village of Shepshed in Leicestershire with those of thc nearby agricultural parish of Bottesford. He argued that thc opportunity of non-agricultural employment resulted in thc estrangement of growing numbers in Shepshed from traditional Malthusian preventive checks, removing thc disincentive to early marriage.79 Since increased fertility, largely caused by a fall in marriage age, was thc main engine of population growtth in England between I 7oo and i850, his demonstration that in Shepshed female age at first marriage fell by more than five years between thc seventeenth century and the second quarter of thc nincteenth compared to only one or two years at Bottesford seems to point to thc causes of population growtth before and during thc industrial revolution.80 However, if we compare thc experience of Shepshed women and those from Gedling, anotherpossibly proto-inidustrial communiity which had some framework knitting, with thc mean age at first marriage for eleven English parishes wsherc family reconstitution studies have been completed, we find that it was much less distinctive than Levine believed (see Table i ). These eleven parishcs cover a wide range of economic types, but significantly they had comparatively little involvement in proto-industry. At thc same time thc period of thc greatest proletarianization during thc early nincteenth century in England as a wlhole did not see a quickening ofr nuptiality, but rather a fall in fertility. This fertility decline after i8i5 was not thc result of a fundamentally different response to economic trends among thc increasing numbers of proto-industrial workers in thc population. Rather it was to be expected from thc experience of earlier generations wihen real wages fell.82 Thc relationship between nuptiality and fertility and variationis in real wages is important, and in England it has been argued that they were closely connected. In thc long term wshen real wages rose so too did nuptiality, albeit with a lag of thirty or forty years, thc level falling again with a similar lag wlhen real wages were stagnant or dropping.83 However, for Medick et al. the relation of fertility to the standard of living is seen very differently. For them it was low wages which encouraged early marriage, since industrial producers were fighting for subsistence and needed to increase production by using more family members. Marriage remained early and wages low in this vicious circle. Similarly, Mendels argued that wihen grain prices fell and linen prices rose in Flanders population also rose, and that it did not decline when real wages fell.84 Thc problem here in part is to explore and distinguish between short-and long-term relationships.85 Proto-industrial thcory does not do this. Its advocates see the demographic effects of falling real wages or adverse internal terms of trade as an unprecedented break from previous relationships between population and resources. This seems dubious in England, wsherc it is possible that thc immiscration which occurred after about I770 'is wihat might be expected in view of previous pre-industrial national experience, and did not represent a new or unlooked for turn of vents .86
III
There are also problems with Levine's discussion of illegitimacy, taken over by proto-industrial thcory. Following thc arguments of Scott and Tilly,87 he argued that where women had more opportunities for employment (as supposedly in protoindustrial households), and wlhere a greater proportion of thc population was no longer dependent on inheritance for its life chances, therce would be more repetitive 91 This is also true of migration. Both B3raun and Levine notice a decline in out-migration from established proto-industrial areas, due, they believe, to the lack of any incentive to move when employment opportunities were easily available. Braun, 'Early industrialization and population change', p. Finally social changes in the role of womcn are said to havc occurred -an carlicr (supposedly rigid) division of labour betwecn the sexes becoming blurred becausc of thc new joint inputs of husband and wifc to the family budget. Levine for cxamplc claims that 'becausc wages werc so low in the framework knitting industry it was vcry difficult for a family to survivc on the husband's carnings alonc', and the themc is strcssed by Mcdick.121 An 'inncr structural changc' occurred, manifcsted 'in the transformation of the division of labour betwcen the sexes, of the configuration of roles within the family, and of I.thc] social charactcr of the wholc family '.22 This could go so far under proto-industry 'as to crasc the traditional division of labour between the sexes and age groups '*123 Proto-industry could cven lcad to 'thc revcrsal of traditional roles... the necessitics of production compcllcd womcn to neglect houschold "dutics" '.124 Thcsc changes in the sexual division of labour arc held to havc becn closcly bound up with thosc in affcctive and sexual behaviour. 125 Howevcr, from the work of Alicc Clark, Pinchbeck, Richards, Sncll and others it is clcar that womcn in England beforc the ninctcnth century took part in a widc rangc of cmploymcnts, which becamc progrcssively limited to mcn by and during the ninctcnth century.126 In agriculturc and the artisan trades morc gencrally the period aftcr about I 750 saw a reduction of participation rates for womcn, a changc away from carlicr and morc sexually shared work-allocations, which werc themsclves duc both to traditional family production and to labour shortages consequent on demographic stagnation and a high lcisurc prefcrcncc.
The lack of a sexual division of labour in proto-industrial occupations followed a similar pattcrn to carlicr artisan family cconomics: womcn in England had becn apprcnticed to many other trades besides framework knitting or wcaving.127 Therc was nothing novel in their cmploymcnt in cightcnth-century proto-industrial occupations.'28 Similarly womcn worked widely in the old-stylc textilc and other industrics of Leiden in the Nctherlands during the seventcenth century, but their participation actually decrcased subsequently.129 Such work by all family mcmbers can bc found widely in England, and in this rcspect the gencralized cmphasis placed on proto-industry as a transformer of' traditional' sexual divisions of labour appears quitc misplaced.13:l V Proto-industrial thcory purports not only to describc the usual pattcrn of developing rural domestic industry, but also to cxplain why industrialization occurred. Therc arc threc main posited connexions: proto-industry provided the opportunity for the accumulation of capital which could bc used for investmcnt in the factory system; by incrcasing population it provided a labour forcc for industrialization; and ovcrscas markets were secured for their (supposedly all-important) role in absorbing factory producc.
The problem raised by Kriedtc of 'assigning cmpirically vcrifiablc indicators' to proto-industry is cspecially marked here. Dcbatc on industrialization in Europc is still hindered by paucity of cmpirical data on such aspects as rcal wages and the class, regional and sexual location of the homc market; the rclativc proportions of domestic industrial product absorbed by the homc or ovcrscas market; or the sources of labour and capital for factories. Britain is frequently held up as a 'classic casc' of the industrializing aspect of proto-industrial theory, and it is fortunatc that its cxpericncc is among the best documcnted. First, it is difficult to asscss the thcsis that 'A group of merchant-manufacturcrs, middlemen, and sometimes small artisans cmerged who became the agents of industrialization, backed by capital which they had accumulated during proto-industrialization '.3 Therc is limited cvidencc that the transition from handloom to power wcaving was facilitated by investmcnt in the lattcr from somc handloom manufacturcrs, especially in the I 82os although thc thcory would havc this happcning carlicr and on a larger scalc. Somc handloom wcavcrs werc also employed by master spinncrs.132 Howevcr, the long and socially unfortunatc persistencc of both forms of production alongsidc each other is not suggestivc of cntreprcncurial agreemcnt on the bencfits of changes in technology or the rcorganization of production. As latc as I830 therc werc about 6o,ooo power looms in England and Scotland, but still 240,ooo handlooms.133 Nor was therc much ovcrlap by region of handloom and factory power-loom wcaving which is contrary to proto-industrial theory.134 4Wc should note that this industry is putting-out system for thc production of' linen yarn rncn l:)ecame incrcasingly involved in agriculturc alonc, whilc women and children werc almost wholly working at spinning. Scc Dodgshon, Land and society in early Scotland, p. 
